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CONFRONTING MEMORY LOSS
Paul F. Rothstein* & Ronald J. Coleman†
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment grants
“the accused” in “all criminal prosecutions” a right “to be
confronted with the witnesses against him.” A particular
problem occurs when there is a gap in time between the
testimony that is offered and the cross-examination of it, as
where—pursuant to a hearsay exception or exemption—
evidence of a current witness’s prior statement is offered and,
for some intervening reason, her current memory is impaired.
Does this fatally affect the opportunity to “confront” the
witness? The U.S. Supreme Court has, to date, left unclear the
extent to which a memory-impaired witness can afford a
criminal defendant her right to confront. Would, for instance,
it be of any value to permit a defendant the opportunity to crossexamine a witness claiming no recollection of having seen the
crime or having identified the defendant as the perpetrator?
Should the right to confront simply imply the ability to look
one’s accuser in the eye at trial, or should it necessitate some
degree of opportunity for substantive cross-examination? Two
petitions for certiorari that the U.S. Supreme Court denied in
December 2019—White v. Louisiana and Tapia v. New York—
could have permitted the Court to clarify confrontation rights
in memory loss cases. This Article identifies and discusses eight
key issues arising under the Confrontation Clause in
connection with memory impairment in witnesses. Although
the Court chose not to put these issues to rest in the context of
White or Tapia, we anticipate federal and state courts will be
called upon to answer these issues in the coming years, and we
suspect the Court will eventually need to answer them.
Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center specializing
in judicial process and allied subjects. His background includes, inter alia, experience as a
litigator and as a consultant to Congress on federal criminal legislation. The author of
numerous books and articles, Professor Rothstein has written extensively on the
Constitutional Confrontation Clause and related matters.
† Program Attorney and Adjunct Professor of Law at Georgetown Law, and admitted to
practice in New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania.
*
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment grants “the
accused” in “all criminal prosecutions” a right “to be confronted with
the witnesses against him.”1 The U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark
decision in Crawford v. Washington governs modern Confrontation
Clause analysis.2 Under the Crawford regime, the Confrontation
Clause applies to hearsay statements offered against a criminal
defendant pursuant to a hearsay exception or exemption, but only
if such statements are the out-of-court equivalent of “bear[ing]
testimony” at trial.3 These “testimonial” statements cannot be
entered against a criminal defendant unless the hearsay declarant
either (1) appears as a witness for cross-examination or (2) is
unavailable in a situation where there has been a prior, sufficient
opportunity for cross-examination of such declarant.4 While the
Crawford opinion failed to fully define the class of testimonial
statements,5 this class seems to include out-of-court statements that
are meant or understood to offer some type of evidence at trial,

1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Fourteenth Amendment ensures that the Confrontation
Clause also applies to state criminal proceedings. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403
(1965) (“We hold today that the Sixth Amendment’s right of an accused to confront the
witnesses against him is likewise a fundamental right and is made obligatory on the States
by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
2 See 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004) (“Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only
indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution
actually prescribes: confrontation.”).
3 Id. at 51. Not all out-of-court statements are testimonial. For instance, a statement that
has the purpose of helping law enforcement meet an ongoing emergency—such as statements
made to a 911 operator prior to the perpetrator being under control—would likely be found
nontestimonial. See generally Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). Similarly, a
statement in a medical report created for purposes of treating a patient—and without any
contemplation it would be used against a future criminal defendant at trial—might also be
found nontestimonial. See Ronald J. Coleman & Paul F. Rothstein, A Game of Katso and
Mouse: Current Theories for Getting Forensic Analysis Evidence Past the Confrontation
Clause, 57 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 27, 52 (2020) [hereinafter Coleman & Rothstein, A Game of
Katso and Mouse].
4 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53–54 (“[T]he Framers would not have allowed admission of
testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to
testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”).
5 Id. at 68 (“We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of
‘testimonial.’”).
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particularly if such statements were made formally and directed to
a state actor or agent.6
A problem occurs under Crawford and its progeny when there is
a gap in time between the testimony that is offered and the crossexamination of it, as where—pursuant to a hearsay exception or
exemption—evidence of a current witness’s prior statement is
offered and for some intervening reason her current memory is
impaired. Does this fatally affect the opportunity to “confront” the
witness? For instance, suppose a witness is testifying at trial and
the prosecution seeks to enter a prior testimonial statement that
the witness made to law enforcement. Insofar as the rules of
evidence are concerned, this statement might be admissible.7
Normally, the fact that the witness is testifying at trial might be
sufficient to meet the Confrontation Clause’s requirements for
introducing the prior statement. However, suppose that the
testifying witness has suffered some degree of memory loss since
having made the prior statement, such that she cannot recall the
prior statement, the incident described in it, or both.8 Questions
See id. at 51–52.
This might be attempted, for instance, using Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1) or a state
equivalent. That rule requires that the witness now be subject to cross-examination, and
there is a similar question about whether cross-examination of a now memory-impaired
witness can satisfy the rule. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1). But jurisdictions do on occasion hold
that it does satisfy the rule. See, e.g., United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559–60 (1988).
8 A similar issue could arise, for instance, where an individual lost her memory after direct
examination at trial but before cross-examination. This Article generally uses hypotheticals
focusing on the introduction of a prior statement through a memory-impaired witness;
however, we suspect that any rule set by the Court would apply equally to other contexts,
such as memory loss after direct examination but prior to cross-examination. Of course,
memory loss purportedly taking place after direct examination but before cross-examination
may be different from the hypotheticals we present (in which there may be a larger gap in
time between the relevant statement and the cross-examination of it). For instance, when a
trial witness recalls everything on direct examination and then is relatively immediately
cross-examined and purports to forget all important items during cross-examination, a court
may be more likely to question whether the memory loss is genuine unless a credible
intervening cause of the memory loss exists. Memory loss where there is a gap between the
statement and the cross-examination of it is somewhat different from memory loss where the
witness makes the statement at trial and is thereupon cross-examined. In the latter case, the
degree of memory during cross-examination necessarily bears on the veracity of the
statement. But, where there is a substantial gap in time, the veracity of the statement could
seem (at least to a jury) more independent of the witness’s memory at the later crossexamination. Before the Federal Rules of Evidence, a prior statement of a witness on the
6
7
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arise when determining whether such a memory-impaired witness
could afford the defendant her confrontation rights. For example,
should the right to confront simply mean the right to look one’s
accuser in the eye at trial and pose questions on cross-examination,
even if the witness lacks sufficient memory of the events to answer
such questions? Would a witness only meet the requirements of
confrontation if she had the capacity to answer all substantive
questions posed? Should the degree of the declarant’s memory
impairment make a difference?9
In this regard, two petitions for certiorari that the U.S. Supreme
Court denied in December 2019—White v. Louisiana and Tapia v.
New York—could have permitted the Court to clarify the current
state of confrontation rights in memory loss cases.10 In each case,
the prosecution sought to introduce a prior statement by a witness
and the relevant witness testified at trial; but the witness suffered
from memory loss.11 According to the petitioners in each case, the
memory-impaired witnesses were insufficient for purposes of the
Confrontation Clause.12
The purpose of this Article is to identify and discuss eight key
issues arising in connection with memory impairment in
Confrontation Clause witnesses. Part II will offer background on the

stand was still inadmissible hearsay, perhaps partly for this reason. See State v. Saporen,
285 N.W. 898, 901 (Minn. 1939) (“The chief merit of cross examination is not that at some
future time it gives the party opponent the right to dissect adverse testimony. Its principal
virtue is in its immediate application of the testing process. Its strokes fall while the iron is
hot.”).
9 Some degree of guidance may be drawn from a pre-Crawford line of cases on this issue
culminating in United States v. Owens. See 484 U.S. at 557–60 (recounting the line of cases
that preceded Owens). However, the Owens line of cases did not answer all relevant questions,
and it is unclear the extent to which that precedent maintains vitality after Crawford. See
infra Section II.C.
10 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, White v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 647 (2019) (mem.)
(No. 18-8862) [hereinafter White Cert Petition] (stating the question presented); Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari at i, Tapia v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 643 (2019) (mem.) (No. 19-159)
[hereinafter Tapia Cert Petition] (same); see also White, 140 S. Ct. at 647 (denying certiorari);
Tapia, 140 S. Ct. at 643 (same).
11 See generally White Cert Petition, supra note 10; Tapia Cert Petition, supra note 10. The
situations in these two petitions are distinct, and this Article will discuss the facts of each
case in more detail below. See infra Part III.
12 White Cert Petition, supra note 10, at 18–19; Tapia Cert Petition, supra note 10, at 14–
15.
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Confrontation Clause; Part III will present recent certiorari
petitions highlighting problems under the Confrontation Clause
created by witnesses’ memory loss; Part IV will identify and discuss
eight key memory impairment issues; and Part V will conclude.

II. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE BACKGROUND
Prior to Crawford, courts were guided in Confrontation Clause
cases by Ohio v. Roberts.13 Under Roberts, admission of hearsay
statements consistent with the Confrontation Clause required the
declarant’s unavailability and sufficient “indicia of reliability.”14
Crawford and its progeny altered the paradigm, finding that only
so-called “testimonial” statements would trigger the protections of
the Confrontation Clause.15
A. CRAWFORD & TESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS

In Crawford, the prosecution sought to offer “tape-recorded
statement[s]” of the defendant’s wife against the defendant.16 The
wife’s statements had been made to the police, but the defendant
was not afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the wife at trial.17
Notwithstanding the defendant’s argument that admitting the
statements would violate his confrontation rights, the trial court
permitted the prosecution to play the statements for the jury.18 The
defendant was convicted, and the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately
“granted certiorari to determine whether the State’s use of [the
wife’s] statement violated the Confrontation Clause.”19
In an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Court found that
admission of the taped testimony violated the defendant’s

448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Id. at 66 (stating that where evidence fell within “a firmly rooted hearsay exception,”
reliability could be inferred).
15 541 U.S. at 68.
16 Id. at 38.
17 Id. at 38–40. The wife was not able to testify at trial due to “state marital privilege.” Id.
at 40 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(1) (1994)).
18 Id. at 40.
19 Id. at 42.
13
14
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Confrontation Clause rights.20 After reviewing the common law
history of the confrontation right and the text of the Confrontation
Clause, the Court determined that the Clause ensured a procedural
right to cross-examination and was directed at those who “bear
testimony” against the defendant.21 The Court noted, “An accuser
who makes a formal statement to government officers bears
testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to
an acquaintance does not.”22 Accordingly, there existed a core class
of out-of-court “testimonial” statements with which the
Confrontation Clause was concerned, and admission of these
testimonial statements against a criminal defendant without the
opportunity for cross-examination at trial would violate the Clause
(absent the declarant’s unavailability and a prior opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant).23 The Court did not comprehensively
define “testimonial,” but it noted that the term “applies at a
minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a
grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.”24
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O’Connor, wrote a
concurring opinion to denounce the Court’s overruling of Roberts25
even though he believed “Roberts and its progeny” supported the
Court’s result.26 According to the Chief Justice, the Court’s “new

20 Id. at 68–69 (noting that admission of the wife’s “testimonial statement . . . despite the
fact that [the defendant] had no opportunity to cross-examine her . . . is sufficient to make
out a violation of the Sixth Amendment”).
21 Id. at 42–61. Testimony, according to the Court, would typically be a “solemn declaration
or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.” Id. at 51 (quoting
Testimony, NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).
22 Id.
23 Id. at 42–60, 68–69 (outlining the textual, historical, and precedential support for the
Court’s interpretation of the Sixth Amendment).
24 Id. at 68. In coming to its conclusion, the Court also discussed various formulations of
the class of testimonial statements: (1) “ex parte in-court testimony or its functional
equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that
the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants
would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially”; (2) “extrajudicial statements . . .
contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior
testimony, or confessions”; and (3) “statements that were made under circumstances which
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available
for use at a later trial.” Id. at 51–52 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
25 Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
26 Id. at 76.
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interpretation of the Confrontation Clause” was unnecessary, was
not supported “by sufficiently persuasive reasoning,” and would
“cast[] a mantle of uncertainty over future criminal trials.”27 He
argued that neither the U.S. Supreme Court—nor any other court
of which he was aware—had ever distinguished between
nontestimonial and testimonial statements, and he saw “little value
in trading [the Court’s] precedent for an imprecise approximation
at this late date.”28
In footnote 9, Justice Scalia reiterated the following notable
response to the Chief Justice’s criticisms:
[W]hen the declarant appears for cross-examination at
trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at
all on the use of his prior testimonial statements. It is
therefore irrelevant that the reliability of some out-ofcourt statements “‘cannot be replicated, even if the
declarant testifies to the same matters in court.’” The
Clause does not bar admission of a statement so long as
the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it.29
Following Crawford, courts were left with the task of
determining when a given statement would be considered
testimonial. The Court has come to rely on an “objective primary
purpose” analysis in making such determination.30
B. OBJECTIVE PRIMARY PURPOSE

The U.S. Supreme Court has found that a statement will be
considered testimonial when its objective primary purpose is to
create an out-of-court substitute for in-court trial testimony, but
such a statement would be deemed non-testimonial if made for some

Id. at 69.
Id. at 72.
29 Id. at 60 n.9 (majority opinion) (citations omitted).
30 See infra Section II.B.
27
28
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other purpose.31 The Court developed and refined its analysis in
Davis v. Washington32 and Michigan v. Bryant.33
Davis asked the Court to decide when statements directed to law
enforcement personnel at the scene of a crime or on a 911 call would
be testimonial.34 Davis was a consolidated appeal of lower court
domestic disturbance cases: State v. Davis35 and Hammon v. State.36
In the former, the prosecution sought to admit statements made by
an alleged victim to a 911 operator prior to police reaching the
scene.37 In the latter, the prosecution sought to use an alleged
victim’s statements made to the police after officers had reached the
scene and during a time when the accused appeared to be under
control.38 Neither alleged victim testified at trial.39 In rendering its
decision, the Court carved out an “emergency” exception to
testimonial hearsay which relied on the statement’s primary
purpose:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the
course of police interrogation under circumstances
objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an
ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the

See generally Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011). Put differently, a statement would
be testimonial where its objective primary purpose is “to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” Id. at 356 (quoting Davis v. Washington,
547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006)).
32 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
33 562 U.S. 344 (2011).
34 Davis, 547 U.S. at 817.
35 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005), aff’d, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
36 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
37 Davis, 547 U.S. at 817–18.
38 Id. at 819–21. The Court noted that the accused was in the kitchen around the time the
police entered the house, he spoke with the police, and one officer remained with the accused
while the other spoke with the alleged victim. Id. at 819–20 (citing Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at
447).
39 Id.
31
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interrogation is to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.40
As such, the Court determined that the statements in State v. Davis
made prior to police arrival would be nontestimonial, but the
statements in Hammon would be testimonial.41
In Michigan v. Bryant—which built upon Davis—the accused
was convicted of second-degree murder after the prosecution
successfully entered statements made by the mortally wounded
alleged victim to the police in the parking lot of a gas station.42 The
alleged victim died within hours after leaving the gas station, and
the police left the gas station to search for the accused.43 Bryant
differed from Davis in that it, among other things, involved “a fatal
gunshot wound,” an alleged “victim found in a public location,” and
an accused “whose location was unknown” when the police found
the alleged victim.44 Clarifying and refining its opinion in Davis, the
U.S. Supreme Court found that an “ongoing emergency” may be one
example of a situation where the primary purpose of a statement
was not to create a trial record, but it was not the only example:
When, as in Davis, the primary purpose of an
interrogation is to respond to an “ongoing emergency,”
its purpose is not to create a record for trial and thus is
not within the scope of the Clause. But there may be
other circumstances, aside from ongoing emergencies,
when a statement is not procured with a primary
purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial
testimony. . . . Where no such primary purpose exists,
the admissibility of a statement is the concern of state

Id. at 822.
Id. at 827–32. Justice Thomas filed a partial concurrence to register his disapproval of
the Court’s primary purpose test, noting it was both “difficult for courts to apply” and
“characterize[d] as ‘testimonial,’ and therefore inadmissible, evidence that bears little
resemblance to what we have recognized as the evidence targeted by the Confrontation
Clause.” Id. at 834 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
42 562 U.S. 344, 348–49 (2011).
43 Id. at 349–50.
44 Id. at 359.
40
41
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and federal rules of evidence, not the Confrontation
Clause.45
In assessing the primary purpose, the Court noted that “[a]n
objective analysis of the circumstances of an encounter and the
statements and actions of the parties to it provides the most
accurate assessment.”46 Applying the primary purpose analysis to
the facts, the Court determined that the statements in Bryant were
nontestimonial, and thus, “[t]he Confrontation Clause did not bar
their admission” at trial.47
C. MEMORY LOSS PRECEDENT

Since the present Article focuses on memory loss in the context
of the Confrontation Clause, a discussion of the Court’s opinions in
California v. Green,48 Delaware v. Fensterer,49 and United States v.
Owens50 may also prove instructive. One should note that the Court
decided these cases before Crawford, so there is a question as to
whether their logic would still govern the Court’s analysis.51
Green concerned a charge of “furnishing marihuana to a minor”
against John Anthony Green.52 The minor to whom Green allegedly
gave drugs, Melvin Porter, had been “arrested for selling
[marihuana] to an undercover police officer” and had “named”
Green as his supplier.53 As an officer, Officer Wade, later recounted,
Id. at 358–59.
Id. at 360.
47 Id. at 378. Justice Thomas again criticized the Court’s primary purpose analysis in
Bryant. Id. at 378–79 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justices Scalia and Ginsburg both wrote
dissenting opinions to criticize the Court’s opinion, with Justice Scalia charging that it
“distorts our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and leaves it in a shambles.” Id. at 380
(Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 395–96 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
majority’s decision “confounds our recent Confrontation Clause jurisprudence”).
48 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
49 474 U.S. 15, 16–23 (1985) (per curiam).
50 484 U.S. 554 (1988).
51 Notably, Justice Scalia—who authored the Court’s opinion in Crawford and was perhaps
its fiercest defender—also authored the Court’s opinion in Owens. See id. at 555. The Owens
Court relied upon Fensterer, and Justice Scalia cited Green in Crawford. See id. at 558–60
(discussing Fensterer); see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 57, 60 n.9 (2004).
52 Green, 399 U.S. at 151.
53 Id.
45
46
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Porter said that Green phoned him earlier in the month and “asked
him to sell some ‘stuff’ or ‘grass,’ and had . . . personally delivered a
shopping bag containing [twenty-nine] ‘baggies’ of marihuana.”54
Porter sold some drugs from this supply to an undercover officer.55
One week later, “Porter testified at [Green’s] preliminary hearing”
and “again named [Green] as his supplier,” but Porter then asserted
that Green “showed him where to pick up” the bag of drugs outside
of Green’s parents’ house.56 Porter’s preliminary hearing testimony
was subject to “extensive cross-examination” by Green’s counsel.57
Approximately two months later, Porter took the stand at trial
and was “markedly evasive and uncooperative.”58 In particular,
“Porter claimed that he was uncertain how he obtained the
marihuana, primarily” due to the LSD he had taken twenty minutes
prior to Green calling.59 He claimed he was “unable” to recall events
following the call and that the LSD prevented him from
“distinguishing fact from fantasy.”60 Parts of Porter’s preliminary
hearing testimony were read by the prosecutor, and that evidence
was admitted “for the truth of the matter contained therein.”61 With
Porter’s recollection “‘refreshed’ by his preliminary hearing
testimony, Porter ‘guessed’ that he had indeed obtained” the drugs
from behind Green’s parents’ home and had given Green the money
from the sale.62 On cross, Porter indicated it was his recollection of
the preliminary hearing testimony which was “mostly” refreshed,
rather than of the events themselves.63 Officer Wade later took the
stand and recounted Porter’s earlier statement that Green delivered
him the drugs; Wade’s statement was “admitted as substantive
evidence.”64 Porter stated that he had told the truth, “as he then
believed it” to be, both at the preliminary hearing and to Officer

Id.
Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. (quoting People v. Green, 451 P.2d 422, 423 (Cal. 1969)).
59 Id. at 152.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
54
55
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Wade.65 He also insisted he was telling the truth at the trial
regarding his “inability to remember the actual events.”66 Green
was convicted, and the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the
case.67
Justice White, writing for the Court, first focused on the
admission of the preliminary hearing testimony.68 The Court held
that the Confrontation Clause did not require exclusion of a
witness’s prior statements where the witness admitted making such
statements and where the witness might be asked to explain or
defend the inconsistency between a prior and present version of the
relevant events, thereby opening the witness to “full crossexamination . . . as to both stories.”69 The Court then turned to
admission of Porter’s statements to Officer Wade.70 Justice White
noted that, “[i]n the typical case to which the [lower] court
addressed itself,” the trial witness offers a different version of
events “from that given on a prior occasion.”71 In such a situation,
the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at trial is “adequate”
for purposes of the Confrontation Clause to make admissible “both
the casual, off-hand remark to a stranger, and the carefully recorded
testimony at a prior hearing.”72 However, the Court noted that in
the present case, Porter claimed he could not recall the events
occurring after Green telephoned him, so Porter failed to provide
any current version of more important events set out in his earlier
statement.73 Justice White did not reach the question of whether
Id.
Id.
67 Id. at 153.
68 Id. at 155–64. Neither Justice Marshall nor Justice Blackmun took part in the decision,
and Justice Blackmun also did not take part in consideration of the case. Id. at 170.
69 Id. at 164. The Court noted that “[v]iewed historically, . . . there is good reason to conclude
that the Confrontation Clause is not violated by admitting a declarant’s out-of-court
statements, as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective
cross-examination.” Id. at 158. The Court also noted that admission of Porter’s preliminary
hearing testimony would not have violated the Confrontation Clause had Porter “been
actually unavailable,” and so a different result should not be reached when Porter was
actually produced. Id. at 165.
70 Id. at 168 (noting that “a narrow question” regarding “the admissibility of Porter’s
statements to Officer Wade” was “lurking” in the case).
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
65
66

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2020

13

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 1 [2020], Art. 3

108

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:95

Porter’s purported loss of memory so affected Green’s crossexamination right as to “make a critical difference” in application of
the Confrontation Clause, since that issue was not yet ripe.74
Chief Justice Burger wrote a concurring opinion “to emphasize
the importance of allowing the States to experiment”; Justice
Harlan also authored a concurring opinion to discuss, among other
things, the need to take a “fresh look” at the concept of
confrontation.75 In his concurrence, Justice Harlan stated:
The fact that the witness, though physically available,
cannot recall either the underlying events that are the
subject of an extra-judicial statement or previous
testimony or recollect the circumstances under which
the statement was given, does not have Sixth
Amendment consequence. The prosecution has no less
fulfilled its obligation simply because a witness has a
lapse of memory. The witness is, in my view, available.
To the extent that the witness is, in a practical sense,
unavailable for cross-examination on the relevant facts,
. . . I think confrontation is nonetheless satisfied.76
Justice Brennan dissented, arguing that the case raised two
issues: (1) whether the Confrontation Clause permitted the
extrajudicial statements of a witness to be admitted “as substantive
evidence” when the witness claimed the inability to recall “the
events with which his prior statement dealt,” and (2) whether the
Confrontation Clause allowed the “preliminary hearing statement”
of a witness—“made under oath and subject to cross-examination”—
to be used as substantive evidence where the witness claimed the

74 Id. at 168–69. The Court noted that the state court “did not focus” on that issue, nor did
either party address the question. Id. at 169. The Court also pointed out, for instance, that
since it had held “that the admission of Porter’s preliminary hearing testimony is not barred
by the Sixth Amendment despite his apparent lapse of memory, the reception into evidence
of the Porter statement to Officer Wade may pose a harmless-error question which is more
appropriately resolved by the California courts in the first instance.” Id. at 170.
75 Id. at 171 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 173 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]his state
decision imperatively demonstrates the need for taking a fresh look at the constitutional
concept of confrontation.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
76 Id. at 188–89.
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inability to recall “the events with which the statement dealt.”77
Justice Brennan believed that neither statement could “be
introduced without unconstitutionally restricting” the accused’s
right “to challenge incriminating evidence” before the factfinder.78
Fifteen years after Green, in Fensterer, the U.S. Supreme Court
had the opportunity to consider whether admitting opinion
testimony from the prosecution’s expert—who could not “recall the
basis for his opinion”—violated the Confrontation Clause.79 William
Fensterer had been convicted for murdering his fiancée.80 In order
to prove that two hairs found on the alleged murder weapon were
the victim’s—and that one of the hairs had been removed forcibly—
the state relied upon testimony from an FBI special agent.81 At trial,
the special agent testified that one of the hairs was forcibly removed
and explained that “there are three methods of determining that a
hair has forcibly been removed.”82 Later on, however, he testified
that, after reviewing his notes, he had “no specific knowledge as to
the particular way that [he] determined the hair was forcibly
removed other than the fact that one of those hairs was forcibly
removed.”83 On cross-examination, the special agent again could not
remember “which method” he used.84 The trial court overruled
Fensterer’s objection that the special agent’s testimony “precluded
adequate cross-examination,” explaining that such objection went
to weight, rather than admissibility.85 The Delaware Supreme
Court reversed on the basis of the Confrontation Clause, noting
among other things, that “[e]ffective cross-examination and
discrediting of [the special agent’s] opinion at a minimum required
that he commit himself to the basis of his opinion.”86

Id. at 191 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id.
79 Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 16 (1985) (per curiam).
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 16–17.
83 Id. at 17 (quoting Fensterer v. State, 493 A.2d 959, 963 (Del. 1985)).
84 Id. The defense’s expert also attacked the special agent’s theory regarding forcible
removal as the defense expert understood it to be. Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 18 (first alteration in original) (quoting Fensterer, 493 A.2d at 964).
77
78
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The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Delaware Supreme Court,
finding no Confrontation Clause violation.87 The Court stated that,
in general, the Confrontation Clause guaranteed “an opportunity for
effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective
in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”88
As the Court noted:
The Confrontation Clause includes no guarantee that
every witness called by the prosecution will refrain from
giving testimony that is marred by forgetfulness,
confusion, or evasion. To the contrary, the
Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the
defense is given a full and fair opportunity to probe and
expose these infirmities through cross-examination,
thereby calling to the attention of the factfinder the
reasons for giving scant weight to the witness’
testimony.89
The Court noted that cross-examination of the special agent’s
testimony revealed to the jury that the special agent could not even
remember the theory forming the basis of his opinion, and the
defense’s expert was able to suggest the special agent’s theory was
“baseless.”90 According to the Court, the Confrontation Clause
required “no more than this.”91 The Court, however, did not foreclose
the possibility that memory loss could theoretically form the basis
87 Id. (“We now reverse the Delaware Supreme Court’s holding that [the special agent’s]
inability to recall the method whereby he arrived at his opinion rendered the admission of
that opinion violative of [Fensterer’s] rights under the Confrontation Clause.”). It was a per
curiam decision, in which Justice Marshall dissented from the “summary disposition,” Justice
Blackmun would have granted certiorari, and Justice Stevens “reluctantly concur[red]” and
noted that he thought Fensterer should not have been “decided without full argument.” Id. at
23–24 (Stevens, J., concurring).
88 Id. at 20 (majority opinion). That conclusion, the Court found, was “confirmed by the fact
that the assurances of reliability our cases have found in the right of cross-examination are
fully satisfied in cases such as this one, notwithstanding the witness’ inability to recall the
basis for his opinion: the factfinder can observe the witness’ demeanor under crossexamination, and the witness is testifying under oath and in the presence of the accused.” Id.
(citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 n.6 (1980)).
89 Id. at 21–22.
90 Id. at 20.
91 Id.
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of a Confrontation Clause violation, stating that the Court “need not
decide whether there are circumstances in which a witness’ lapse of
memory may so frustrate any opportunity for cross-examination
that admission of the witness’ direct testimony violates the
Confrontation Clause.”92
A few years later, Owens required the Court to consider whether
the Confrontation Clause barred testimony regarding a previous,
“out-of-court identification when the identifying witness” could not
explain the basis for such identification due to memory loss.93 A
correctional counselor at a prison, John Foster, had been beaten,
and he suffered a skull fracture and was hospitalized for nearly a
month.94 When interviewed by an FBI agent approximately a week
after the incident, Foster seemed “lethargic” and was “unable to
remember his attacker’s name.”95 A little over two weeks later, on
May 5, the FBI agent again spoke with Foster, and this time
Foster’s memory seemed much improved.96 Foster was able to
describe the attack, name the accused as his attacker, and identify
the accused from a set of photographs.97
At trial, Foster testified to his activities just prior to the attack,
recounted “seeing blood on the floor” and “feeling the blows to his
head,” and stated that he remembered identifying the accused as
his attacker during his FBI interview on May 5, 1982.98 On crossexamination, Foster conceded that he could not remember: (1)
seeing his attacker; (2) any visitors he received in the hospital, aside
from the FBI agent, even though evidence suggested there were
numerous such visitors; and (3) whether any of the visitors he
received had suggested the accused was the attacker.99 The defense
92 Id. In that connection, the Court declined to decide the question raised by Green, but not
decided by it: “[w]hether [the witness’s] apparent lapse of memory so affected [the accused’s]
right to cross-examine as to make a critical difference in the application of the Confrontation
Clause.” Id. at 21 (first alteration in original) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 168
(1970)).
93 United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 555–56 (1988). Note that Justice Kennedy did not
take “part in the consideration or decision of this case.” Id. at 564.
94 Id. at 556 (describing Foster’s injuries).
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
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“unsuccessfully sought to refresh” Foster’s recollection using
hospital records, including one record that indicated Foster had
attributed the attack to someone other than the accused.100 The
accused was convicted, and the U.S. Supreme Court eventually
granted certiorari.101
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, found that the
Confrontation Clause was not violated.102 He began by noting that
the Court had “never held that a Confrontation Clause violation”
could be founded upon the memory loss of a witness.103 After
reviewing past precedent, Justice Scalia reiterated that the
Confrontation Clause only guaranteed “an opportunity for effective
cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in
whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”104
He argued that this “opportunity is not denied” where a witness
testified to a current belief but was not able to recall “the reason for
that belief.”105 It would be “sufficient,” the Court found, that a
defendant could use cross-examination to make the jury aware of
witness bias, lack of attentiveness or care, poor eyesight, and poor
memory.106 The Court stated that if the ability to inquire about
these matters was a sufficient cross-examination opportunity as to
Id.
Id. at 556–57.
102 Id. at 564 (holding that the Confrontation Clause is not violated “by admission of an
identification statement of a witness who is unable, because of a memory loss, to testify
concerning the basis for the identification”).
103 Id. at 557.
104 Id. at 559 (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739 (1987)). Notably, in the
context of discussing cross-examination under the Federal Rules of Evidence, Justice Scalia
stated:
100
101

Ordinarily a witness is regarded as “subject to cross-examination” when he is placed
on the stand, under oath, and responds willingly to questions. Just as with the
constitutional prohibition, limitations on the scope of examination by the trial court
or assertions of privilege by the witness may undermine the process to such a degree
that meaningful cross-examination within the intent of the Rule no longer exists.
But that effect is not produced by the witness’ assertion of memory loss—which, as
discussed earlier, is often the very result sought to be produced by crossexamination, and can be effective in destroying the force of the prior statement.
Id. at 561–62.
105 Id. at 559 (citing Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)).
106 Id. The Court suggested that highlighting a witness’s bad memory “is often a prime
objective of cross-examination.” Id.
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a witness’s current belief (the basis for which the witness could not
recall), there was no reason why it should be an insufficient
opportunity in connection with a past belief, the basis of which the
witness could not recall.107 In both instances, the belief’s foundation
could not “effectively be elicited, but other means of impugning the
belief” exist.108 The Court found that “memory-testing” was not
required in the latter case, as the Court had previously found in
connection with the former case.109 Although the means of
impugning a witness who asserted memory loss would not always
be effective, the Constitution does not “guarantee” success.110
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented from the
Court’s opinion.111 Justice Brennan argued that if Foster had died
from his injuries, there would be no doubt that the Confrontation
Clause would have barred the FBI agent from recounting Foster’s
identification; Foster’s “profound memory loss” rendered him “no
less a conduit for stale and inscrutable evidence” than the FBI agent
would have been.112 In Justice Brennan’s view, the Court’s opinion
reduced the confrontation right to a “markedly hollow,” purely
procedural protection, whereas he believed criminal defendants
were guaranteed a right to cross-examination “sufficient to afford
the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of a prior
statement.”113 According to Justice Brennan, the accused’s real

107
108

Id.
Id. The Court continued:
[I]f there is any difference in persuasive impact between the statement “I believe
this to be the man who assaulted me, but can’t remember why” and the statement
“I don’t know whether this is the man who assaulted me, but I told the police I
believed so earlier,” the former would seem, if anything, more damaging and hence
give rise to a greater need for memory-testing, if that is to be considered essential
to an opportunity for effective cross-examination.

Id. at 559–60.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 560. The Court also pointed out that the defense does have realistic weapons, as
demonstrated by Owens’s counsel’s summation, “which emphasized Foster’s memory loss and
argued that his identification” of the accused resulted from suggestions provided by hospital
visitors Foster received. Id.
111 Id. at 564 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
112 Id.
113 Id. at 565 (alterations omitted) (quotations omitted).
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“accuser” was the Foster from May 5, not the Foster on the stand.114
He pointed to Court precedent suggesting that the right to confront
ensures “an opportunity for effective cross-examination.”115 Justice
Brennan believed that the Confrontation Clause guaranteed “more
than the right to ask questions of a live witness, no matter how dead
that witness’ memory proves to be,” and he would have found a
Confrontation Clause violation.116
Owens remains the leading U.S. Supreme Court case on memory
impairment in the context of the Confrontation Clause, but it leaves
many issues unresolved. In particular, even assuming Owens
survives Crawford, it is unclear whether Owens would govern the
Court’s analysis in a case where the witness has an arguably lesser
degree of recollection than the witness in Owens.117 This issue was
raised by two recent certiorari petitions, and we turn to these
petitions in Part III.

III. THE RECENT SUPREME COURT PETITIONS
The U.S. Supreme Court considered the certiorari petitions in
White v. Louisiana and Tapia v. New York in December 2019.118
Both afforded the Court an opportunity to clarify confrontation
rights in memory loss cases.119
In White, a defendant—Roderick White—had been convicted of
second-degree murder.120 White was one of three passengers with
Brandon Coleman, who was driving around Baton Rouge.121
Nearby, Gregory Spears was selling compact discs out of his car, and

114 Id. at 566 (“The principal witness against respondent was not the John Foster who took
the stand . . . .”).
115 Id. at 567 (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)).
116 Id. at 572.
117 Importantly, the Court did not face the situation in Green, Fensterer, or Owens where a
witness completely forgot the criminal incident and her statements to law enforcement about
the underlying incident. See infra Part IV.
118 See White v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 647, 647 (2019) (mem.) (denying certiorari); Tapia v.
New York, 140 S. Ct. 643, 643 (2019) (mem.) (same).
119 See White Cert Petition, supra note 10, at i; Tapia Cert Petition, supra note 10, at i.
120 White Cert Petition, supra note 10, app. at 2. In the absence of full U.S. Supreme Court
opinions in White and Tapia, the facts of these cases are derived from the lower court rulings,
rather than from any assertions of the parties in their petition-related briefings.
121 Id.
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NaQuian Robinson drove by, got out, and purchased some discs
from Spears.122 As Spears and Robinson stood talking, Coleman
stopped at a carwash nearby.123 White exited the car, walked over
to Spears and Robinson, and asked Spears about some discs.124
Spears turned to look in the trunk, and White pulled out a gun and
attempted to rob Robinson.125 Robinson and White “wrestled over
the gun,” and Robinson “was shot multiple times.”126 White ran
away and was eventually picked up and driven away by Coleman.127
After getting into his car and driving a short distance, Robinson
“crashed into a fence.”128 His family brought him to the hospital,
where he died from his wounds.129 Spears could not identify the
shooter.130 The police brought Coleman in for questioning, and he
implicated White in the shooting.131
White did not testify at the trial,132 but Coleman did.133 The
prosecutor noted that Coleman had “had a fall” and “may or may
not have some issues with the memory.”134 During the direct
examination, Coleman knew his birth date and age, but testified to
having some memory issues that began around September of the
prior year.135 He testified that he could “not remember anything”
about the incident in which Robinson was shot, nor could he recall
“talking to the police about the shooting.”136 Coleman was able to
identify himself when the prosecutor played a “snippet” of his
videotaped statement.137 Over defense counsel’s Confrontation
Clause objection, Coleman’s videotaped statement was played at

Id.
Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. app. at 3.
134 Id.
135 Id. app. at 3–4.
136 Id. app. at 4.
137 Id.
122
123
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trial.138 On cross-examination, Coleman testified that he could not
recall speaking with his father—who was in the videotaped
statement—and could not recall any event on the day of the
shooting, stating that “[a]fter September, I don’t remember
nothing.”139
On appeal, White argued that the trial court erred in permitting
the jury to hear Coleman’s videotaped statement to the police.140
More specifically, White contended that Coleman’s failure to recall
at trial the events surrounding Robinson’s shooting or the giving of
Coleman’s videotaped statement violated White’s right to
confrontation as Coleman could not “be effectively or meaningfully
cross examined” regarding his videotaped statement.141
The Louisiana Court of Appeal, First Circuit, considered, among
other things, Crawford’s footnote nine and Owens, and it
determined that the trial court had not erred in admitting
Coleman’s statement.142 As the court said, “a declarant’s
appearance and subjection to cross examination at trial are all that
is necessary to satisfy the right to confrontation, even if the
declarant suffers from memory loss.”143
On January 14, 2019, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied
certiorari.144 On April 11, 2019, White filed a certiorari petition to
the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing, among other things, that: (1)
Coleman’s memory loss made him useless as a trial witness, aside
from his value as a “vehicle” for admitting “an ex parte police
interrogation”;145 (2) lower courts were “in conflict” as to the
application of Owens to cases of “complete” memory loss146 and as to
Id.
Id.
140 Id. app. at 2.
141 Id.
142 Id. app. at 5, 7 (“In footnote nine of its opinion, the Crawford court stated that ‘when
the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no
constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.’ It further stated, ‘[t]he
Clause does not bar admission of a statement as long as the declarant is present at trial to
defend or explain it.’”) (second alteration in original) (citation omitted).
143 Id. app. at 6.
144 Id. app. at 8. One justice dissented from the denial of certiorari, but the dissent primarily
focused on considerations in the Louisiana Constitution, specifically “whether the Louisiana
Constitution requires greater safeguards than the Sixth Amendment.” Id. app. at 11.
145 Id. at 6.
146 The petition argues:
138
139
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whether Owens could be reconciled with Crawford in “genuine”
memory loss cases; and (3) federal and state courts were opposed in
result in genuine memory loss cases.147
In particular, the White certiorari petition sought to distinguish
three categories of memory loss: (1) the witness recalled the incident
but not the statement about it, (2) the witness recalled the
statement but not the incident, and (3) the witness recalled neither
the statement nor the incident.148 The petition termed the third type
of memory loss “complete” memory loss and the first two types
“partial” memory loss.149 White asserted that Owens only concerned
partial memory loss because the relevant witness recalled the
statement but not the incident.150 The petition then argued that,
prior to White, the U.S. Supreme Court had never “squarely
confronted” a case of “complete memory loss.”151
In Tapia, filed some months after White, Sergeant Charlie Bello
had testified that he had been driving Lieutenant James Cosgrove
when Bello saw the defendant “body slam” the alleged victim and
“drag” the victim between parked cars.152 Bello testified that after
separating the victim from the defendant, he noticed that the victim
was “bleeding profusely from his face and neck.”153 Bello saw
shattered glass, and the victim had sustained several injuries

Three categories of memory loss are relevant to determining a witness’ availability
for confrontation and therefore the admissibility of that witness’ hearsay. A witness
may remember the incident but not remember a subsequent statement about it.
The witness may not remember the incident itself but be able to remember a
statement about it. Or, as in this case, the witness may not remember the incident
or the statement. The first two categories are fairly termed partial memory loss,
while the third constitutes complete or total memory loss.
Id. at 7. The petition asserts that the witness in Owens “suffered from partial memory loss of
the second kind; he did not remember the incident, but he did remember making the
statement sought to be introduced.” Id.
147 Id. at 11–12.
148 See supra note 146.
149 Id.
150 White Cert Petition, supra note 10, at 7.
151 Id. at 2, 7 (“At trial Coleman could recall neither (a) the crime itself nor (b) his statement
to the police.”). The petition also advanced the point that Louisiana “never contested the
genuineness or completeness of Coleman’s memory loss.” Id. at 3.
152 Tapia Cert Petition, supra note 10, app. at 2a.
153 Id.
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consistent with having been cut with a dangerous instrument.154
The victim also testified to having been attacked “from behind” and
identified the defendant as one of the attackers.155
The prosecution produced Cosgrove to testify, but he could not
independently recall the incident.156 When the prosecution sought
to introduce Cosgrove’s prior grand jury testimony as a “past
recollection recorded,” the defense objected on Confrontation Clause
grounds, arguing that Cosgrove’s memory loss meant he could not
be meaningfully cross-examined.157
On the stand, Cosgrove testified to having worked the shift with
Bello, and, based on a review of paperwork, he was able to testify to
assisting in the arrest of two individuals.158 He was, however,
unable to recall the circumstances which led to the defendant’s
arrest.159 Cosgrove also provided testimony to support admission of
his prior grand jury testimony, stating that the prior testimony “did
not refresh his present recollection of the events.”160
A portion of Cosgrove’s prior grand jury testimony was read into
the record.161 The grand jury testimony added that Cosgrove
witnessed the defendant “kick the victim in the head.”162 On crossexamination, Cosgrove admitted, among other things, that he had
been to the area of the attack on various occasions due to
altercations there, that he could not recall details of such
altercations, and that he could not swear the court reporter’s
transcript of his grand jury testimony was accurate due to his lack
of independent recollection.163 The jury found the defendant guilty
of attempted first-degree assault, and the Appellate Division
affirmed, based in part on its finding of no Confrontation Clause
violation.164
Id.
Id. app. at 2a–4a.
156 Id. app. at 3a.
157 Id.
158 Id. app. at 4a.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. The court noted that “Cosgrove’s grand jury testimony, which was consistent with
Bello’s trial testimony, was brief and not particularly detailed.” Id. app. at 5a.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id. app. at 7a.
154
155
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The New York Court of Appeals also affirmed the conviction.165
The court found unavailing defendant’s argument that, despite
Cosgrove testifying at trial, his memory failure rendered Cosgrove
unavailable for cross-examination for purposes of the Confrontation
Clause.166 The court stated that the right to confront includes both
the right to cross-examine witnesses and the right to confront the
accuser “in a face-to-face encounter before the trier of fact.”167 The
court cited Owens as directly on point where a witness could not
explain the basis for a past out-of-court statement because of
memory loss,168 and stated that Crawford “maintained the
fundamental importance of a witness’s presence at trial” even
though that decision “changed the landscape.”169 Accordingly, the
court held that Cosgrove’s presence at the trial as a witness where
Cosgrove was subject to cross-examination precluded the
defendant’s Confrontation Clause argument.170
On July 31, 2019, the defendant (then petitioner), filed a
certiorari petition to the U.S. Supreme Court.171 The petition
argued, among other things, that the decision below was incorrect
and that lower appellate courts disagreed concerning how the
Confrontation Clause applied to prior testimonial statements where
memory loss was involved.172 Similar to the petition in White, the
Tapia petition argued that Owens only “involv[ed] partial (rather
than total) memory loss” and that, unlike in Tapia, the defendant

Id.; see also People v. Tapia, 124 N.E.3d 210, 220 (N.Y. 2019).
Tapia Cert Petition, supra note 10, app. at 9a–10a.
167 Id. app. at 16a (citations omitted).
168 Id. app. at 16a–17a.
169 Id. app. at 17a. The court also quoted the following text from footnote nine of Crawford:
“[W]hen the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places
no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements. . . . The Clause does not
bar admission of a statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain
it.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 n.9 (2004)).
170 Id. The dissent did not really deal with the Confrontation Clause issue, but it did raise
questions about the applicability of Owens and the value of cross-examining a memoryimpaired witness in the context of discussing a state criminal procedure law. See id. app. at
18a–40a (Wilson, J., dissenting).
171 See generally Tapia Cert Petition, supra note 10.
172 See id. at 10–11, 14.
165
166

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2020

25

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 1 [2020], Art. 3

120

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:95

in Owens “could at least use the witness’s impaired memory to cast
doubt on the reliability of his prior identification.”173
On December 9, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari
in both White and Tapia.174 Although neither White nor Tapia
squarely raised all the issues we believe need resolution in the
memory loss area, the Court arguably could have used either
petition as a vehicle for clarifying the law.175 If nothing else, that
two such petitions were recently filed reflects the need for greater
clarity. In Part IV, we will identify and discuss eight issues we
believe require resolution in this area.

IV. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE & MEMORY LOSS
There are at least eight important issues arising in the context
of memory loss in Confrontation Clause witnesses. We will discuss
each of these issues in turn using illustrative hypotheticals. For
each hypothetical, we will assume that all relevant witness
statements are testimonial, that the statements are otherwise
admissible,176 and that the only potential basis for exclusion would
be that the witnesses’ memory-impaired trial testimony is
insufficient to meet the standards of the Confrontation Clause.177
Prior to discussing the issues, we must set out four assumptions.
First, whatever we may think of Owens, we accept it as a given for
purposes of our discussion.178 We assume the U.S. Supreme Court
would still consider Owens binding post-Crawford, in particular
because Justice Scalia authored both opinions and likely would have

173 Id. at 2. Although the Tapia petition uses the word “total” to describe the memory loss
here, it elsewhere uses the word “complete,” so we assume it intends these terms to be
interchangeable. See id. at 11.
174 See White v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 647, 647 (2019) (mem.) (denying certiorari); Tapia v.
New York, 140 S. Ct. 643, 643 (2019) (mem.) (same).
175 Of the two petitions, we believe that White would have been the better vehicle.
176 For instance, we will assume the prior out-of-court statements are admissible pursuant
to federal or state hearsay rules. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801(d).
177 In our discussion of each issue, we will also seek to focus on only the specific issue we
are considering. As such, any facts or issues not presented should be treated as held constant.
For instance, when discussing the cause of the memory loss, we focus only on the cause and
we control for other issues, such as whether the memory loss is genuine.
178 For a discussion of Owens, see supra notes 93–116 and accompanying text.
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anticipated that they could be interpreted consistently.179 Second,
flowing from our acceptance of Owens, we suspect that the logic
underpinning any rule the Court may set on our eight issues would
be what minimum opportunity for cross-examination is sufficient
under the circumstances to test witness credibility.180 Third, we
believe the Court would prefer to set a bright-line rule rather than
to adopt a case-by-case approach, and we take that as a given for
purposes of our discussion.181 Finally, because we anticipate that a

179 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. That Green was cited in Crawford may further
suggest that pre-Crawford memory loss cases such as Owens were intended to survive
Crawford. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 57 (2004) (citing California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 165–68 (1970)).
180 See, e.g., United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559 (1988) (“‘[T]he Confrontation Clause
guarantees only “an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that
is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”’ . . . [T]hat
opportunity is not denied when a witness testifies as to his current belief but is unable to
recollect the reason for that belief. It is sufficient that the defendant has the opportunity to
bring out such matters as the witness’ bias, his lack of care and attentiveness, his poor
eyesight, and even []what is often a prime objective of cross-examination, . . . the very fact
that he has a bad memory.” (first alteration in original) (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482
U.S. 730, 739 (1987))). Albeit outside the memory loss context, the U.S. Supreme Court has
been deeply divided recently on what degree of cross-examination is required to satisfy the
Confrontation Clause. See infra note 240; see also Paul F. Rothstein, Unwrapping the Box the
Supreme Court Justices Have Gotten Themselves Into: Internal Confrontations over
Confronting the Confrontation Clause, 58 HOW. L.J. 479, 481 (2015) (“[A] majority of Justices
on the Court may be looking for a way . . . to escape what they regard as the rigid box the
Court has gotten itself into with Crawford.”). We suspect the Court will be similarly divided
in memory loss cases.
181 We believe the Court would prefer a bright-line approach due to its criticism of the
subjectivity of the Roberts reliability approach. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63 (“Reliability is
an amorphous, if not entirely subjective, concept. There are countless factors bearing on
whether a statement is reliable . . . .”). We recognize that the primary purpose test used in
the Confrontation Clause context incorporates some degree of subjectivity, but that test has
been accordingly criticized. See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 834 (2006) (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Today, a mere two years after the Court
decided Crawford, it adopts an equally unpredictable test, under which district courts are
charged with divining the ‘primary purpose’ of police interrogations.”); Michigan v. Bryant,
562 U.S. 344, 379 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I have criticized the primary-purpose test
as ‘an exercise in fiction’ that is ‘disconnected from history’ and ‘yields no predictable results.’”
(citation omitted)); id. at 383 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The only virtue of the Court’s approach
(if it can be misnamed a virtue) is that it leaves judges free to reach the ‘fairest’ result under
the totality of the circumstances.”). A case-by-case approach could also make it difficult for
criminal defendants to prepare their defenses. Specifically, depending on the subjectivity of
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bright-line approach would be the Court’s preference, our discussion
generally focuses on witnesses completely forgetting the criminal
incident, their statements to law enforcement, or both, rather than
merely forgetting certain details. Although it would be an
interesting exercise to consider whether recollection of certain types
of details—or a certain number—provides an optimal level of
credibility testing, we believe a test based on such fine distinctions
would lead to the very type of discretionary case-by-case
determination the Court would likely disfavor. With those
assumptions set, we proceed to discuss the eight issues.
A. PARTIAL OR COMPLETE MEMORY LOSS

Alison, Bobby, and Caitlin are the prosecutions’ witnesses in
three separate battery trials. They had each previously provided
statements to the police, and they each now suffer from some degree
of memory loss. Alison recalls the incident but cannot recall making
her statements to the police. Bobby can remember making his
statements to the police but can no longer remember the incident.
Caitlin can recall neither the incident nor her statements to the
police. Each witness willingly takes the stand, but their directs and
cross-examinations are limited due to their memory impairments.
The prosecution in each case seeks to enter each witness’s prior
statements to the police, and the defense in each case raises an
objection pursuant to the Confrontation Clause. Should Alison,
Bobby, or Caitlin’s prior statements be excluded?
As an initial matter, one might refer to witnesses like Alison and
Bobby—who recall either the incident or their statements—as
suffering from only “partial” memory loss, and witnesses like
Caitlin—who can recall neither the incident nor their statements—
as suffering from “complete” memory loss.182 The witness in Owens
notably fell into the former category—he could recall making the

the approach, defense attorneys may not be able to adequately advise defendants as to which
evidence would be deemed admissible in any given case.
182 We borrow this “partial” and “complete” memory loss terminology from the certiorari
petition in White. See White Cert Petition, supra note 10, at 7.
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identification of his assailant but not seeing his assailant—and so
Owens did not directly speak to complete memory loss.183
In resolving the Alison-Bobby-Caitlin hypothetical, then, the
Court could theoretically take several approaches. First, the Court
could extend Owens and simply find that memory loss of any form
fails to raise a confrontation issue. We will refer to this as the
“Owens-Plus” approach.184 Under such an approach, the statements
of Alison (recalls the incident but not the statements), Bobby
(recalls the statements but not the incident), and Caitlin (recalls
neither the incident nor the statements) would all be entered into
evidence. Second, the Court could decide that Owens does not
survive Crawford and that a witness who cannot recall the incident
or statements is now procedurally insufficient for the Confrontation
Clause. Owens was decided pursuant to the Roberts regime, which
had focused on “reliability.”185 Crawford recognized that the
Confrontation Clause’s “ultimate goal [was] to ensure reliability of
evidence,” but the Court stated “that reliability [must] be assessed
in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of crossexamination.”186 The primacy Crawford placed on testing through
cross-examination could cause the current Court to no longer feel

183 Owens, 484 U.S. at 556 (“At trial, Foster recounted his activities just before the attack,
and described feeling the blows to his head and seeing blood on the floor. He testified that he
clearly remembered identifying respondent as his assailant during his May 5th interview
with Mansfield. On cross-examination, he admitted that he could not remember seeing his
assailant.”); see also Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief and Brief of National Ass’n
of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 9–10, White v.
Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 647 (2019) (mem.) (No. 18-8862) [hereinafter NACDL Brief]. Of course,
an important distinction exists between a witness who recalls only the incident and one who
recalls only the statement, and we will address this issue further below.
184 We call this the Owens-Plus approach to denote that Owens itself did not foreclose the
possibility that complete memory loss could render a witness insufficient for Confrontation
Clause purposes.
185 Owens, 484 U.S. at 560 (focusing on “indicia of reliability” (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400
U.S. 74, 89 (1970)); see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (“In sum, when a hearsay
declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally
requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it
bears adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’ Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where
the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.”).
186 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61–62 (2004) (finding that the Confrontation
Clause provided “a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee”).
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bound by Owens.187 Under an approach where Owens no longer
governed, possibly none of Alison, Bobby, or Caitlin’s statements
would be admitted. Finally, the Court could opt for a middle
approach, pursuant to which recollection of the criminal incident
and/or the statements to law enforcement, or both, were sufficient
for Confrontation Clause purposes.188 We will refer to this as the
“Middle” approach.189 Under such an approach, the Court might
conclude, for instance, that witnesses with partial memory loss—or
certain types of partial memory loss—can satisfy the Confrontation
Clause, but witnesses with complete memory loss cannot.
Some logic would support the Court taking the Middle approach
and drawing some Confrontation Clause distinction between the
situations of Alison (recalls incident but not statements), Bobby
(recalls statements but not incident), and Caitlin (recalls neither
incident nor statements). The Court may feel, as it did in Owens,
that the Clause necessitates only some “opportunity for effective
cross-examination, [but] not cross-examination that is effective in
whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”190
For instance, a witness like Alison (recalls the incident but not
the statements) or Bobby (recalls the statements but not the
incident) might offer the defense some opportunity for crossexamination on substantive matters,191 while the defense retains

187 Perhaps the Court would reason that, if Owens had arisen after Crawford, it might have
been decided differently.
188 Recall that, because we believe the Court would prefer a bright-line approach, we are
focused here on a witness completely forgetting the incident or their statements. We do not
consider approaches that, for instance, would require lower courts to consider which specific
details or how many details would be sufficient in a given case. If the Court were to take an
approach focused on, for instance, recalling certain details, we suspect that the most
important details to recall would include: (1) the fact making the event criminal and (2) the
identity of the culprit. Accordingly, we suspect that lack of memory regarding other details
might be comparatively less relevant.
189 Of course, more extreme approaches than those we set out here are possible—such as
overruling Crawford—but such approaches are beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Brief
of Fern and Charles Nesson as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 3, 9–10, White v.
Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 647 (2019) (mem.) (No. 18-8862) (urging the Court to overrule
Crawford); David Crump, Overruling Crawford v. Washington: Why and How, 88 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 115, 115 (2012) (discussing the overruling of Crawford).
190 Owens, 484 U.S. at 559 (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739 (1987)).
191 For instance, in a case where the witness can at least recall making the statement:
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the ability to highlight the areas Alison and Bobby cannot recall to
diminish credibility. In contrast, Caitlin (recalls neither the
incident nor the statements) would not afford the defense almost
any substantive opportunity for cross-examination,192 and would
merely permit the defendant to highlight her forgetfulness for the
jury.193 The Court could draw support for such a Middle approach
from Crawford’s footnote nine, in which the Court made two
potentially conflicting statements: (1) “when the declarant appears
for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no
constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements”;
and (2) “[t]he Clause does not bar admission of a statement so long
as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it.”194 The
former statement appears to support an Owens-Plus approach, but
the latter appears to support a Middle approach. Specifically, it
would be nearly impossible for a witness like Caitlin (recalls neither

The defendant can elicit testimony from such a witness about . . . whether he was
under the influence of any substance at the time he made his statement; whether
he felt any compulsive pressure from the police; or whether there were any other
circumstances that created a motive to lie.
NACDL Brief, supra note 183, at 9–10. Again, a witness recalling the incident only and one
recalling the statements only would arguably not offer the same degree of credibility testing,
as discussed further below.
192 See, e.g., Brief of Richard D. Friedman, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition for Writ
of Certiorari at 4, White, 140 S. Ct. 647 (No. 18-8862) [hereinafter Friedman Brief] (“Others,
such as those in this case, appear to believe that so long as the witness is able to appear and
take an oath that is sufficient. The Court should resolve this dispute, clarifying that the latter
position makes a mockery of the Confrontation Clause.”); NACDL Brief, supra note 183, at
10 (“A declarant who, though he cannot recall witnessing the crime itself, can remember
making his accusatory statement to the police may still be subject to useful, if imperfect,
cross-examination. But a declarant who . . . can recall neither the events he supposedly
witnessed nor accusing the defendant, is no better than a witness who fails to appear for cross
examination at all.”).
193 See Claire L. Seltz, Sixth Amendment—The Confrontation Clause, Witness Memory Loss
and Hearsay Exceptions: What Are the Defendant’s Constitutional and Evidentiary
Guarantees—Procedure or Substance?, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 866, 896 (1988)
(“Indeed, if carried to the greatest extreme, Justice Scalia’s reasoning [in Owens] would allow
the admission of a prior, out-of-court identification of any willing witness on the stand who
answers questions, even if all of the answers were ‘I forget’ or ‘I do not know.’”).
194 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 n.9 (emphasis added); see also Friedman Brief,
supra note 192, at 6–7 (discussing division among lower courts regarding the meaning of
Crawford’s footnote nine).
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the incident nor the statements) to explain or defend her
statements, since the most she could do would be to testify that she
cannot recall them.195
The Court could also, for example, see differences between the
situations of Alison—who recalls the incident but not her
statements—and Bobby—who recalls his statements but not the
incident. Arguably, Alison would permit the defense a greater
possibility for cross-examination than Bobby. Alison’s recollection of
the criminal incident would permit the defense to question Alison
on all aspects of the alleged crime, whereas the defense could not
question Bobby regarding what he saw or heard at the scene.
Instead, the defense in Bobby’s case could only probe him on his
belief at the time he made his statements to the police. For this
reason, the Court could determine that a witness like Bobby (recalls
the statements but not the incident) would not afford a defendant
sufficient cross-examination, but a witness like Alison (recalls the
incident but not the statements) would.
Since we take Owens as a baseline and assume a bright-line
approach, we think that the Court would most likely support either
an Owens-Plus approach (memory loss is no bar) or an extremely
permissive version of the Middle approach (recollection of incident
or statements is sufficient). If the Court opted for a permissive
Middle approach, we believe one rule with some merit would be: the
ability to answer any non-de minimis questions about the event or
statement renders a witness sufficient for Confrontation Clause
purposes.196 “Non-de minimis” makes clear that nearly any
recollection is sufficient, and courts should not need to excessively
weigh the nature or degree of recollection.
At a minimum, if the Court opts for any type of a Middle
approach, we anticipate the Court would generally treat those who
fully recall either the incident or their prior statements similarly.197
195 Notably, the witness in Owens not only recalled having subsequently identified the
respondent, but he also recalled at least some piece of the incident, and this could have subtly
influenced the Court. See Owens, 484 U.S. at 556 (“Foster recounted his activities just before
the attack, and described feeling the blows to his head and seeing blood on the floor.”).
196 Although use of the term “non-de minimis” in particular still introduces some element
of subjectivity, we believe lower courts could more easily and consistently apply this approach
than if terms such as “substantial” or “substantive” were used.
197 Many fine distinctions—which could theoretically offer different degrees of witness
credibility testing—exist, such as the following four. First, a witness could recall the facts
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We think the Court could reasonably determine that a witness who
recalls only the incident offers a greater opportunity for crossexamination than a witness who recalls only their statements.
However, in Owens, the Court found no violation of the
Confrontation Clause where the witness could not recall seeing the
assailant but could recall later identifying the accused as his
assailant.198 Although the witness in Owens could seemingly recall
some aspects relating to the incident,199 and although the Court
could theoretically retrench from Owens, the Court would most
likely treat a witness like Alison (recalls the incident but not the
statements) and Bobby (recalls the statement but not the incident)
similarly.
B. SIMPLY FORGOTTEN OR DEMONSTRABLE-CAUSE MEMORY LOSS

Two individuals—Larry and Tammy—are slated to testify
against accused murderers at upcoming trials. Both have claimed
complete memory loss since giving statements to law enforcement
immediately after the alleged murders. Larry claims to have lost his
memory due to the passage of time since the incident, and Tammy
claims to have lost her memory due to head trauma suffered in a car

stated in her former statement and vouch that they are true. Second, the witness could recall
making the statement and testify that (a) “I do not recall the underlying facts, but I recall
having made a true statement”; (b) “my statement must have been true”; (c) “if I said it, it
was true”; (d) “I said it, but it was not true”; (e) “I did not say it and it was not true”; or (f) “I
said it, but I cannot say whether it was true or not.” Third, the witness could fail to recall
whether she made the statement, and (a) deny the underlying facts reported in the statement;
(b) affirm those underlying facts; (c) fail to recall those underlying facts; or (d) now tell a
different story. Fourth, the witness could refuse to avow or disavow the statement, while
admitting that she made it. Certain similar distinctions could arise in the context of deciding
whether or not a witness’s former statement is hearsay. See PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, DAVID
CRUMP & RONALD J. COLEMAN, EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL ch. 8, § I (7th ed., forthcoming).
Although each of these situations could afford the defense a slightly different range and
degree of cross-examination, we suspect that the Court would not require lower courts to
make such distinctions for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.
198 Owens, 484 U.S. at 556 (“[The witness] testified that he clearly remembered identifying
[the defendant] . . . . On cross-examination, [the witness] admitted that he could not
remember seeing his assailant.”).
199 The Owens witness could recall certain parts of having been at the scene: activities
directly prior to the attack, having felt blows to his head, and having seen blood on the floor.
Id.
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accident a few months after the incident. After Larry and Tammy
provide their memory-impaired testimony at trial, the State seeks
to enter their prior statements to law enforcement. Would
admission of such statements violate the Confrontation Clause?
The Larry and Tammy hypothetical raises the question of
whether the law should treat someone who loses memory due to
forgetfulness or the natural passage of time differently from
someone who loses memory due to a demonstrable cause.200 The
U.S. Supreme Court could find that demonstrable-cause memory
loss (here, Tammy’s head trauma) permits a slightly lesser
opportunity to challenge credibility. For instance, a cross-examiner
in Larry’s case (natural forgetfulness) could attempt to imply to the
jury that if the murder really took place—or took place the way
Larry described it—Larry would recall it. The same might not apply
in Tammy’s case (memory loss due to head trauma), where the jury
would presumably have an understandable rationale for her
memory loss. As such, the Court could take the position that Larry
(the forgetful witness) satisfies the Confrontation Clause, but
Tammy (the witness suffering from demonstrable-cause memory
loss) does not.
The Court may also have good reason to find that demonstrablecause memory loss witnesses should meet the Confrontation Clause,
at least in the case of certain causes. Consider, for instance,
dementia. Millions of Americans suffer from Alzheimer’s or other
forms of dementia.201 As the U.S. population aged sixty-five and
above continues to increase in size and proportion, the number of
Americans suffering from Alzheimer’s or other forms of dementia
will only increase.202 This number is expected to escalate rapidly in

200 By “demonstrable cause” we mean recognized causes other than merely forgetting or
having a poor memory, such as trauma or some type of clinical condition.
201 See Alzheimer’s Ass’n, 2019 Alzheimer’s Disease Facts and Figures, 15 ALZHEIMER’S &
DEMENTIA 321, 330 (2019) (“Millions of Americans have Alzheimer’s or other dementias.”);
see also Ann M. Murphy, Vanishing Point: Alzheimer’s Disease and Its Challenges to the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1245, 1276 (2012) (“It is beyond question
that there will be a dramatic increase in the number of people within the justice system who
suffer from [Alzheimer’s Disease] in the years ahead.”).
202 See Alzheimer’s Ass’n, supra note 201, at 330 (“[T]he population of Americans age [sixtyfive] and older is projected to grow from [fifty-five] million in 2019 to [eighty-eight] million by
2050.”).
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the coming years.203 Given the scale of Alzheimer’s and dementia in
the United States, if individuals with such conditions are precluded
from acting as Confrontation Clause witnesses, a great quantum of
evidence could be excluded from U.S. trials.204 Although the Court
may ignore these practical considerations—such as how its rule
impacts law enforcement—the impact on law enforcement policy
could be profound, and the Court should at least be aware of it. By
the same token, however, finding a demonstrable-cause memory
loss witness sufficient means a tremendous number of largely
untested convictions may pass constitutional muster.
Drawing a distinction between forgetfulness and memory loss
due to a demonstrable cause may be difficult, particularly given that
a sharp dividing line between the two may not always exist. Even
with input from trustworthy medical professionals, it may not
always be clear whether someone has an unusually poor memory,
forgets events due to the natural passage of time, or suffers from a

Id.
This may be particularly problematic in the context of crimes lacking a statute of
limitations, where dementia and related conditions could act as an informal statute of
limitations in at least a percentage of cases. See Ronald J. Coleman & Paul F. Rothstein,
Grabbing the Bullcoming by the Horns: How the Supreme Court Could Have Used Bullcoming
v. New Mexico to Clarify Confrontation Clause Requirements for CSI-Type type Reports, 90
NEB. L. REV. 502, 546 (2011) [hereinafter Coleman & Rothstein, Grabbing the Bullcoming]
(discussing the risk of an effective statute of limitations on murder in a different context); see
also Carolyn Zabrycki, Comment, Toward a Definition of “Testimonial”: How Autopsy Reports
Do Not Embody the Qualities of a Testimonial Statement, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1093, 1115 (2008)
(“[E]xcluding the autopsy report where a medical examiner dies effectively functions as a
statute of limitations for murder, at least in the many situations in which the use of autopsy
reports is integral to obtaining convictions by establishing the time and cause of death.”). For
instance, suppose that an accused was recently charged with, among other things, murder in
connection with the rape and killing of a female high school student that took place many
years ago. Assume no statute of limitations exists for murder in the state where charges are
brought. Around the time of the killing, an elderly janitor had informed the police that he
witnessed the victim speak to the accused and get into the accused’s car, and then witnessed
the car drive away. Due to lack of other physical evidence at the time, however, the State did
not have enough evidence to bring a case against the accused. Years later, some physical
evidence is uncovered implicating the perpetrator, but the State still needs the janitor’s
testimony to make its case. By the time charges are brought, the janitor is retired and has
developed Alzheimer’s. In a case such as this, even though state lawmakers specifically
decided to leave open the possibility of bringing an action against an accused many years
after a murder, the State would be effectively precluded from getting a conviction if a memoryimpaired witness, such as the janitor, was insufficient for Confrontation Clause purposes.
203
204
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known or unknown demonstrable condition. Since we take Owens
as a given and believe the Court will prefer a bright-line approach,
we suspect that the Court’s rule will not turn solely on whether the
memory loss is due to forgetfulness or a demonstrable cause. We
believe that a witness suffering demonstrable-cause memory loss
generally offers the defense a lesser opportunity for crossexamination than a witness who lost memory due to natural
forgetfulness; however, we suspect the Court would not require
lower courts and local stakeholders to make case-by-case
determinations as to which is which for every relevant witness.
C. MEMORY LOSS INITIATED BY DEMONSTRABLE CAUSE PRIOR TO
STATEMENT OR AFTER STATEMENT

Mia and Jacklyn testify at different theft trials. Both previously
gave statements to law enforcement, and both now testify to having
suffered complete memory loss. At trial, Mia testifies to having
complete memory loss triggered by a blow to the head she suffered
prior to giving statements to law enforcement. Jacklyn has complete
memory loss due to a blow to the head she suffered after giving her
statements but prior to trial. Should the court treat Mia and
Jacklyn differently from a Confrontation Clause standpoint?
This hypothetical raises the issue of whether it should matter if
the memory loss is initiated by a demonstrable cause prior to giving
statements to law enforcement or after giving such statements.
Memory loss initiated by a demonstrable cause prior to giving
statements—as in Mia’s case—certainly seems to call the credibility
of the statements into question more than memory loss initiated by
a demonstrable cause after giving the statements—as in Jacklyn’s
case. The defense in Mia’s case (demonstrable cause prior to
statements) might more easily imply that Mia’s statements could
not have been credible when made, given that her memory was
already impaired when she initially made the statements. In
contrast, the defense in Jacklyn’s case (demonstrable cause after
statements) would not have the opportunity to make a
corresponding attack.
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The witness in Owens suffered memory loss as a result of injuries
sustained during the course of the events recounted.205 When the
FBI first attempted to interview the Owens witness, the
interviewing FBI agent found him “lethargic and unable to
remember his attacker’s name.”206 The witness named Owens as his
attacker only in a subsequent interview.207 Although the Owens
witness may not have permanently lost his memory prior to making
the identification, the very fact that some memory loss could have
taken place prior to the identification arguably provides the defense
with an avenue to attack witness credibility in a way not available
to the defense when the memory loss is initiated by a demonstrable
cause after the statements.208
In setting its rule, the Court will need to decide whether to give
such a credibility distinction decisive weight. If the Court did seek
to make a distinction between memory loss initiated by a
demonstrable cause prior to the statement on one hand and memory
loss initiated by a demonstrable cause after the statement on the
other, the difficulties in any given case could include the following:
(1) knowing whether there was a demonstrable cause (as discussed
above); (2) understanding whether the demonstrable cause came
before the statement (particularly if the alleged cause is a clinical
condition); and (3) identifying when the memory loss was actually
initiated. In connection with initiation of the memory loss, must
counsel conclusively show that some memory loss took place prior
to the statements? Would the Court require medical or other expert
testimony? Would it be sufficient that the defense could show that

205 See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 556 (1988) (stating the witness’s “memory
was severely impaired” after he was “beaten with a metal pipe”).
206 Id.
207 Id. (noting that the witness identified Owens “from an array of photographs” during his
second interview with an FBI agent).
208 See id. at 559 (noting that the defense could use cross-examination to undermine witness
credibility by highlighting “the very fact that he has a bad memory”); Friedman Brief, supra
note 192, at 4 (“The witness [in White v. Louisiana] lost his memory suddenly as the result of
an accident that occurred between the making of the statement and the trial. The memory
loss has no bearing whatsoever on the credibility of the witness in making the prior
statement, but it provides a complete shield against any meaningful cross-examination. The
case is therefore materially different from [Owens], in which the witness was the victim of
the assault and the cause of the memory loss was the assault itself; there, the witness’s bad
memory may have cast some doubt on the credibility of the statement.” (citation omitted)).
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some memory loss could have taken place prior to the statement?
What if the witness lost some memory prior to the statement,
regained complete memory after the statement without affirming or
disaffirming the statement, but then completely lost memory prior
to trial? Given that we suspect the Court will adopt a bright-line
approach which discourages case-by-case determinations, we
anticipate that the Court will not require local courts to determine
when memory loss was initiated or whether a demonstrable cause
existed prior to the statement. Accordingly, although we believe it
is an important factor for credibility testing, we do not believe the
Court’s rule will turn solely on whether the memory loss was
initiated by a demonstrable cause prior to, or after, the statement.
D. ACCUSED INVOLVED OR UNINVOLVED WITH MEMORY LOSS

Mara and Roger are prosecution witnesses in upcoming battery
and arson trials. Both witnesses were inside the relevant structures
when the fires began, both informed officers on the scene about what
they saw, and both have now suffered complete memory loss. Mara’s
memory loss resulted from the accused striking her on the head with
a crowbar while attempting to flee the crime scene, but her memory
loss did not set in until sometime after she made her statements to
the officers. Roger’s memory loss was unrelated to the incident or
the accused but instead resulted from an injury at work sometime
after he made his statements to the officers. If the State attempts
to introduce Mara and Roger’s previous statements in connection
with their testimony, would the Confrontation Clause prevent
admission of the statements?209
An important question raised by this hypothetical is if it should
matter whether the accused caused the witness’s memory loss. One
could argue that, for reasons of fairness, if a witness’s inability to
provide sufficient Confrontation Clause testimony resulted from
wrongful acts of the accused, the accused has forfeited her
confrontation rights.
In Crawford, the Court specifically accepted “forfeiture by
wrongdoing” as a continuing “exception[] to the Confrontation
One should note that, like Mara, the witness’s memory impairment in Owens resulted
from injuries allegedly inflicted by the accused hitting him on the head “with a metal pipe.”
See Owens, 484 U.S. at 556.
209
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Clause.”210 Currently, the leading case on this forfeiture exception
is Giles v. California.211 In Giles, the Court considered whether a
defendant would forfeit her Confrontation Clause right to crossexamine a witness when the defendant’s “wrongful act” caused the
witness to be unavailable to testify.212 Justice Scalia, writing for the
Court, found that the defendant only forfeits his or her
Confrontation Clause rights if “the defendant engaged in conduct
designed to prevent the witness from testifying.”213 Although Giles
has been criticized,214 we assume for the purposes of this discussion
that it represents the present state of the law on the forfeiture
exception.
Applying the Giles rule to Mara’s hypothetical situation (memory
loss due to the defendant striking her with a crowbar during the
210 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004). The Crawford Court recognized that
the forfeiture exception “extinguishe[d] confrontation claims on essentially equitable
grounds.” Id.
211 554 U.S. 353 (2008).
212 Id. at 355, 358–59 (discussing whether the forfeiture exception “is a founding-era
exception to the confrontation right”). In Giles, the accused had allegedly shot his exgirlfriend six times, and the State sought to introduce certain prior statements by her against
him. Id. at 356 (noting that she had made statements “to a police officer responding to a
domestic-violence report about three weeks before the shooting”).
213 Id. at 359. There is some indication that, in certain circumstances, the requisite “intent”
might be more broadly construed. Id. at 377 (“Acts of domestic violence often are intended to
dissuade a victim from resorting to outside help, and include conduct designed to prevent
testimony to police officers or cooperation in criminal prosecutions. Where such an abusive
relationship culminates in murder, the evidence may support a finding that the crime
expressed the intent to isolate the victim and to stop her from reporting abuse to the
authorities or cooperating with a criminal prosecution—rendering her prior statements
admissible under the forfeiture doctrine.”); Eileen A. Scallen, Coping with Crawford:
Confrontation of Children and Other Challenging Witnesses, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1558,
1571 (2009) (“Although Justice Scalia would require a showing of specific intent to make the
witness unavailable for the forfeiture doctrine to apply, he opined that this showing could be
met in many domestic violence cases when it culminates in murder because of the ‘intent to
isolate the victim.’” (quoting Giles, 554 U.S. at 377)).
214 See, e.g., Scallen, supra note 213, at 1571 (“[I]nstead of establishing a bright-line rule,
the Giles Court splintered, producing only a murky plurality decision. All of the justices
agreed that common law recognized a forfeiture doctrine that allowed ‘the introduction of
statements of a witness who was “detained” or “kept away” by the “means or procurement” of
the defendant.’ But the Court could not agree on the standard for finding forfeiture.” (quoting
Giles, 554 U.S. at 359)); Friedman Brief, supra note 192, at 15 (noting “that Giles was a most
unfortunate development, and that it inhibits development of sound confrontation doctrine
in various respects”).
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incident), the accused in her case would still seemingly not have
forfeited his confrontation rights—assuming he was intending to
flee the scene when he struck Mara rather than trying to prevent
her from testifying.215 However, if the Court ultimately determines
that memory loss can sometimes offend the Confrontation Clause, a
rethinking of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine could help
mitigate some of the negative law enforcement consequences that
may follow. Given that the forfeiture exception is based on equitable
principles, it certainly seems perverse for the accused in Mara’s case
to benefit procedurally from having knocked her in the head with a
crowbar.216 Although the Court need not revisit its interpretation of
the forfeiture exception to clarify its position in memory loss cases,
it may be wise for the Court to consider doing so soon after.
E. GENUINE OR SUSPECT MEMORY LOSS

Suppose James and Bella take the stand as prosecution
witnesses in cybercrime trials, and both claim complete memory
loss. Further suppose that in James’s case, the defense suspects
that James has fabricated his memory loss.217 In Bella’s case,
however, all involved parties agree that Bella’s memory loss is
genuine.218 When the State seeks to enter prior statements James
and Bella provided to law enforcement, should the Confrontation
Clause apply differently in each case?
The above hypothetical raises the issue of how courts should
treat memory loss that is suspect in the context of confrontation
rights. If the Court takes the position that—in certain or in all
instances—a memory-impaired witness is sufficient for the
Confrontation Clause, courts will likely face situations where a
witness lies about having suffered memory loss. For instance, in the
215 See Giles, 554 U.S. at 361 (“The manner in which the rule was applied makes plain that
unconfronted testimony would not be admitted without a showing that the defendant
intended to prevent a witness from testifying.”).
216 See Friedman Brief, supra note 192, at 14 (“If in fact Owens assaulted Foster, and caused
his grievous injury, it would be highly inequitable to allow Owens to keep Foster’s statement
from the jury on the ground that Owens had been unable to cross-examine Foster.”).
217 Perhaps, for example, James’s behavior and actions suggest he may actually recall his
prior statements and the underlying criminal event.
218 Suppose, for instance, that voluminous medical records and the opinions of respected
medical personnel support the genuineness of Bella’s memory loss.
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above hypothetical, suppose James (suspected of fabricating
memory loss) was the true perpetrator of the cybercrime, and he
invented his prior statements to law enforcement in order to help
convict the accused. Suppose further that James is now concerned
that inconsistencies may arise between his prior statements and his
present testimony on the stand, so he feigns complete memory loss.
Should the Court eventually face this issue, we anticipate that
the Court would rely on cross-examination of the witness at trial to
uncover any fabricated memory loss. Cross-examination appears fit
to this purpose and is otherwise relied upon in the Confrontation
Clause context to test reliability and credibility.219
F. MEMORY LOSS VERSUS ASSERTION OF PRIVILEGE

Imagine Megan and Stewart testify for the prosecution in
securities-related criminal matters. Both have provided statements
to government regulators prior to the trials. Megan takes the stand
but then asserts her privilege against self-incrimination in response
to all the questions posed to her. When Stewart takes the stand, he
answers “I cannot recall,” due to complete memory loss, to all the
questions posed to him. If the defense raises a Confrontation Clause
objection to the admission of Megan and Stewart’s prior statements,
should the trial court exclude the statements?
This hypothetical raises the question of whether the
Confrontation Clause should apply differently in assertion of
privilege cases and complete memory loss cases. The U.S. Supreme
Court has already ruled on the assertion of privilege issue.220 In
Douglas v. Alabama, a witness had asserted the privilege against
self-incrimination and “refused to answer any questions concerning

219 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (“[The Confrontation Clause]
commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”); United States v. Owens, 484 U.S.
554, 559 (1988) (discussing use of cross-examination to “bring out such matters as the witness’
bias, his lack of care and attentiveness, his poor eyesight, and . . . that he has a bad memory”
(citation omitted)); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 652 (2011) (“The accused’s right
is to be confronted with the analyst who made the certification [in the forensic report], unless
that analyst is unavailable at trial, and the accused had an opportunity, pretrial, to crossexamine that particular scientist.”).
220 See generally Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
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the alleged crime.”221 Nevertheless, the trial judge declared that the
witness was a hostile witness and allowed the state solicitor to read
the witness’s confession as part of cross-examining the witness.222
The Court found that the accused’s “inability to cross-examine [the
witness] as to the alleged confession plainly denied him the right of
cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause.”223
Applying Douglas to Megan’s hypothetical case (assertion of
privilege), the trial court would likely exclude Megan’s prior
statements.224 One might argue, then, that the court should exclude
Stewart’s (complete memory loss) prior statements, too. After all, a
witness answering substantive questions with “I cannot recall”
would hardly seem to offer a greater degree of cross-examination
than one asserting privilege in connection with those same
questions.
On the other hand, at least two possibly relevant distinctions
between memory loss and privilege exist. First, the assertion of
privilege is generally a voluntary decision, whereas genuine
memory loss is normally involuntary.225 Second, and perhaps more
importantly, the defense can attack the witness’s credibility in a
memory loss case by forcing the witness to repeatedly answer “I

Id. at 416.
Id. (“Under the guise of cross-examination to refresh [the witness’s] recollection, the
Solicitor purported to read from the document [that supposedly contained the witness’s
signed confession].”). Three law enforcement officers then identified the confession document,
but although it was marked as an exhibit, it was not entered into evidence. Id. at 417.
223 Id. at 419. The Court noted the following:
221
222

Although the Solicitor’s reading of [the witness’s] alleged statement, and [the
witness’s] refusals to answer, were not technically testimony, the Solicitor’s reading
may well have been the equivalent in the jury’s mind of testimony that [the witness]
in fact made the statement; and [the witness’s] reliance upon the privilege created
a situation in which the jury might improperly infer both that the statement had
been made and that it was true.
Id. (first citing Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 557–58 (1956); then citing
United States v. Maloney, 262 F.2d 535, 537 (2d Cir. 1959)).
224 For purposes of the hypothetical, we will assume that the lower court finds that Douglas
remains good law.
225 Death, however, is often involuntary, and it is unclear that the Court would treat death
and complete memory loss similarly. Death is further removed than privilege, of course, in
that the defendant at least has the literal opportunity to face a witness asserting privilege at
trial.
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cannot recall” in front of the jury. The testimony of a witness like
Stewart—who cannot recall anything about the incident or
statements he purportedly gave—may raise serious doubts in the
jury’s mind as to the accuracy and credibility of his statements.226
In contrast, the testimony of a witness like Megan—who simply
asserts privilege—would not afford the defendant a corresponding
opportunity to attack her credibility in front of the jury.227
Accordingly, we do not believe that the Court would feel constrained
to treat assertion of privilege and complete memory loss similarly.
G. CHILD VERSUS ADULT MEMORY LOSS

Jenny, five years old, told police one year ago about an incident
of sexual abuse involving her father. The State has now charged
Jenny’s father with crimes relating to the alleged assault. Upon
taking the stand at her father’s trial today, Jenny testified that she
was no longer able to recall the incident or her statements to the
police. She testified that she was not aware of any specific reason
for her memory loss and that she had no reason to doubt that she
would have been truthful at the time. The State seeks to enter
Jenny’s out-of-court statements to the police as evidence against
Jenny’s father. Should the Confrontation Clause bar their entry?
If the U.S. Supreme Court takes the position that a witness with
complete memory loss is insufficient for Confrontation Clause
purposes, the above hypothetical raises the question of whether the
Court would treat statements by children differently. The Court
might be sensitive to how interpretations of the Confrontation
Clause impact the hearsay statements of children, particularly in
cases involving child sexual abuse and domestic violence.228 As one
commenter notes:
226 As Justice Scalia stated in Owens, “[A] defendant seeking to discredit a forgetful expert
witness is not without ammunition, since the jury may be persuaded that ‘his opinion is as
unreliable as his memory.’” United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 558 (1988) (citing Delaware
v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 19 (1985)).
227 Of course, depending on the privilege claimed, in some instances the jury may in fact
believe the witness is hiding something. See Douglas, 380 U.S. at 419 (“[The witness’s]
reliance upon the privilege created a situation in which the jury might improperly infer both
that the statement had been made and that it was true.”).
228 See Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 247–48 (2015) (“Statements by very young children will
rarely, if ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause.”); Friedman Brief, supra note 192, at 7
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[P]olicy and public pressure on the courts mitigate in
favor of interpretations that allow continued use of child
hearsay exceptions. . . .
....
. . . Because of the damaging impact to prosecutions
in the already politically-charged context of child sexual
abuse, there will be public pressure on courts to narrow
the definition of testimonial statements, and to expand
n.2 (arguing right of examination with respect to children “should be measured by the
Constitution’s Due Process Clause, rather than by the Confrontation Clause, and the
examination need not be either by an attorney or in court” (citing Richard D. Friedman &
Stephen J. Ceci, The Child QuasiWitness, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (2015))); Michael H. Graham,
Indicia of Reliability and Face to Face Confrontation: Emerging Issues in Child Sexual Abuse
Prosecutions, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 19, 92 (1985) (“With respect to establishing unavailability,
legislatures and courts should amend current statutes and rules to provide specifically for
unavailability based upon the presence of, or potential for, severe psychological injury to a
child witness if forced to face the defendant in open court.”); Laurie E. Martin, Note, Child
Abuse Witness Protections Confront Crawford v. Washington, 39 IND. L. REV. 113, 114 (2005)
(arguing that “Crawford should not affect protection of child witnesses”); Robert P. Mosteller,
Crawford’s Impact on Hearsay Statements in Domestic Violence and Child Sexual Abuse
Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 411, 412 (2005) [hereinafter Mosteller, Crawford’s Impact]
(discussing Crawford’s potential impact on statements in domestic violence and child abuse
context); Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine Under
the Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 791 [hereinafter
Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause] (“[W]here the state uses videotaped depositions,
the only deviation from the Confrontation Clause’s ideal is that the child’s testimony is
videotaped outside the jury’s physical presence, which preserves the detail and demeanor of
the witness’s testimony. The important tradition of public trials and live testimony should
mean that courts should not accept videotaped testimony without some justification but that
a very minimal showing should be sufficient.”); Paul F. Rothstein, Ambiguous-Purpose
Statements of Children and Other Victims of Abuse under the Confrontation Clause, 44 SW.
L. REV. 508, 551–52 (2015) (“[I]f [the Court] were to affirm the lower court’s decision . . . that
the teacher’s duty to report child abuse brings the child’s statement to her within the
Confrontation Clause, this would outlaw a broad range of prosecution evidence . . . .”);
Scallen, supra note 213, at 1590–91 (“[T]here are times when the right to confrontation must
give way to other powerful societal interests, such as protecting children from additional
trauma by testifying in the physical presence of their alleged abuser.” (citing Maryland v.
Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 853 (1990))). Notably, use of hearsay may be particularly important in
this context. See, e.g., Mosteller, Crawford’s Impact, supra at 426 (“Cases involving child
sexual abuse and domestic violence are particularly susceptible to negative consequences
because they often critically depend on hearsay to prove the case. Domestic violence cases in
particular rely on statements especially likely to be considered testimonial because they are
given to government agents in a context that suggests to everyone involved that a criminal
prosecution is likely to ensue.”).
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the scope of other exceptions, to minimize Crawford’s
impact. This public and political pressure, as well as the
uncertainty about whether Crawford’s mandates will
further the truth-seeking goals of confrontation,
supports lower court interpretations that minimize or
eliminate any impact Crawford may have on child
hearsay exceptions and protective in-court procedures
for child witnesses.229
Another commenter has argued, for instance:
[B]ecause children obviously differ from adults, society
is willing to rethink procedures and evidentiary rules.
We begin almost with a presumption that the ground
rules should be different. Thus, the initial inquiry is
what changes to make in the process rather than
whether it should be altered at all. That inquiry, in
turn, quickly moves to how fundamental the
modifications should be.230
As such, the Court could—at least in theory—seek to interpret
confrontation rules differently in connection with memory
impairment in children.231
If the Court did choose to set a different confrontation rule in
child memory loss cases, the challenge would be how to technically
and consistently do so. One option would be for the Court to set a
separate bright-line rule for children, the most obvious of which
Martin, supra note 228, at 142–43 (footnote omitted).
Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause, supra note 228, at 692.
231 See, e.g., Clark, 576 U.S. at 246–51 (finding a three-year-old’s statements to his teachers
were nontestimonial); Craig, 497 U.S. at 840 (holding that the Confrontation Clause does not
“categorically prohibits a child witness in a child abuse case from testifying against a
defendant at trial, outside the defendant's physical presence, by one-way closed circuit
television”); see also supra note 228 and accompanying text. Proof and cross-examination in
child cases may also be problematic. See, e.g., Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause,
supra note 228, at 692 (“Children frequently have difficulty testifying effectively as a result
of their different and somewhat limited abilities to remember, conceptualize, and
communicate, and because of fear and the obstacles presented by the courtroom setting.”);
Mosteller, Crawford’s Impact, supra note 228, at 415 (“The reality is that cross-examining
children is challenging in any situation and some defense attorneys may not be up to the
task.”).
229
230
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being that the Owens-Plus approach232 applies to those below a
certain age, even though it does not apply to those at or above that
age. While possibly expedient, setting a fair and reasonable brightline rule for child witnesses might be difficult. Another option would
be for the Court to adopt a case-by-case approach, where courts
would be required to balance the protection and well-being of the
relevant child with the defendant’s confrontation rights.233 Perhaps
this would entail the prosecution making a sufficient showing of
necessity234 or perhaps the Court would look to a set or open list of
factors—such as the age and sophistication of the child, the cause of
the memory loss, the degree of memory loss, which details are
recalled and which are not, and the defendant’s actions. As
previously noted, the Court may be disinclined to use a balancing
approach where the defendant’s confrontation rights are at issue,235
and Justice Scalia in Crawford specifically derided the subjective
reliability approach that had existed under the Roberts regime.236
We suspect that the U.S. Supreme Court would not choose to
address children witnesses’ memory loss unless a case directly
raised the issue to the Court. However, since lower courts are likely
to face the issue prior to it reaching the Court, we think the Court
should at least consider the implications of any rule it sets for child
witnesses. Specifically, if the Court takes a position other than the
Owens-Plus approach, it should—at a minimum—contemplate
further developing the concept it raised in Ohio v. Clark that, under
232 Recall that, by the Owens-Plus approach, we mean that even a witness with complete
memory loss could afford a defendant her confrontation rights. See supra note 184 and
accompanying text.
233 See, e.g., Craig, 497 U.S. at 853 (“We likewise conclude today that a State’s interest in
the physical and psychological well-being of child abuse victims may be sufficiently important
to outweigh, at least in some cases, a defendant’s right to face his or her accusers in court.”).
For a discussion of the Court’s holding in Craig, see Martin, supra note 228, at 122–24;
Scallen, supra note 213, at 1566.
234 Craig, 497 U.S. at 855–56 (describing the case-specific nature of the necessity
determination).
235 See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67–68 (2004) (“By replacing categorical
constitutional guarantees with open-ended balancing tests, we do violence to their design.”);
Craig, 497 U.S. at 860 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Seldom has this Court failed so conspicuously
to sustain a categorical guarantee of the Constitution against the tide of prevailing current
opinion.”); Martin, supra note 228, at 122–24.
236 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63 (“Reliability is an amorphous, if not entirely subjective,
concept. There are countless factors bearing on whether a statement is reliable . . . .”).
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the primary purpose test, the statements of “very young children
will rarely, if ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause.”237 In
determining whether a statement is testimonial, the primary
purpose test analyzes whether the objective primary purpose of the
conversation is to create a substitute for trial testimony; in Clark,
the Court stated it was “extremely unlikely that a 3-year-old child
in [the witness’s] position would intend his statements to be a
substitute for trial testimony.”238 If the Court were to expand upon
this principle, it might help mitigate any potential negative
consequences for children flowing from the memory loss rule the
Court ultimately sets.239
H. EXPERT OR LAY WITNESS

Dr. Marie Planck conducted a forensic analysis which tied an
accused to the crime. After rendering the analysis and authoring a
report on its findings, Dr. Planck suffered complete memory loss.
She could not recall being engaged to conduct the analysis,
conducting the analysis, authoring the report, the basis for the
report, whether it was accurate, or any other facts or circumstances
regarding the analysis or the crime. No one else was involved in the
analysis or the report’s creation, nor did anyone review or approve
the report. Retesting the samples is now impossible. Dr. Planck
takes the stand at the accused’s trial to support admission of her
forensic report, but she can only testify that she lacks all memory of
the facts and circumstances surrounding the report and the crime.
Should the Confrontation Clause bar admission of her report?

576 U.S. 237, 247–48 (2015).
Id. at 248 (“Few preschool students understand the details of our criminal justice
system. Rather, ‘[r]esearch on children’s understanding of the legal system finds that’ young
children ‘have little understanding of prosecution.’ . . . [A] young child in these circumstances
would simply want the abuse to end, would want to protect other victims, or would have no
discernible purpose at all.” (first alteration in original) (citation omitted)); see also id. (noting
historical precedent suggesting statements in circumstances of Clark would have been
admissible at common law).
239 The Court could also consider whether other populations beyond children deserve
special protections, such as domestic violence victims. See, e.g., Deborah Weissman, Crawford
v. Washington: Implications for Public Health Policy and Practice in a Domestic Violence
Context, 121 PUB. HEALTH REP. 464, 464–66 (2006) (commenting on the impact of Crawford
on domestic violence prosecutions).
237
238
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In recent years, the Confrontation Clause’s application to expert
witnesses and forensic reports has been hotly debated.240 The
relevant question for the purposes of this Article is whether the law
would treat an expert witness with complete memory loss
differently than a similarly situated lay witness. In Fensterer, the
Court found no Confrontation Clause violation in admitting an
expert’s opinion when the expert could not recall the theory forming
its basis, noting that the expert’s impaired memory could be
illustrated to the jury to diminish reliability of the evidence.241
Notably, the expert in Fensterer did not appear to lose all memory
of the relevant facts and circumstances of the case, given that he
was still able to explain at trial that there were three methods for
determining that a hair was forcibly removed (even if he could not
recall which one was used to form the basis of his opinion), and that
a hair was forcibly removed.242 The Fensterer Court did not foreclose
the possibility that more extreme memory loss could lead to a
violation of confrontation rights.243 A witness like Dr. Planck—who

See, e.g., Stuart v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 36, 36 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (lamenting
that Williams “yielded no majority and its various opinions have sown confusion in courts
across the country”). Indeed, recent opinions in this area have produced sharp disagreements
among Justices. See Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 86 (2012) (plurality opinion) (finding
that an expert witness from a state police laboratory could discuss a DNA profile prepared by
an outside laboratory, that was not itself admitted, consistent with the Confrontation Clause);
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 652 (2011) (holding that the “Confrontation Clause
[does not] permit[] the prosecution to introduce a forensic laboratory report containing a
testimonial certification—made for the purpose of proving a particular fact—through the incourt testimony of a scientist who did not sign the certification or perform or observe the test
reported in the certification”); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 309–311 (2009)
(holding that affidavits reporting results of forensic analysis were testimonial); Coleman &
Rothstein, Grabbing the Bullcoming, supra note 204, at 524–57 (discussing the status of open
Confrontation Clause issues before and after Bullcoming); Ronald J. Coleman & Paul
Rothstein, Williams v. Illinois and the Confrontation Clause, PUBLICSQUARE.NET (Dec. 6,
2011),
https://www.publicsquare.net/2011/12/williams-v-illinois-confrontation-clause/
(discussing items at issue in Williams); Coleman & Rothstein, A Game of Katso and Mouse,
supra note 3, at 28 (reviewing six theories that could allow forensic evidence to be admissible
under the Confrontation Clause).
241 Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per curiam).
242 Id. at 16–17 (describing what the expert could remember).
243 Id. at 20 (“We need not decide whether there are circumstances in which a witness’ lapse
of memory may so frustrate any opportunity for cross-examination that admission of the
witness’ direct testimony violates the Confrontation Clause.”).
240
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forgets all facts and circumstances regarding the case or report—
certainly seems to present a more extreme case than in Fensterer.
The Court could decide to treat memory-impaired expert
witnesses differently than lay witnesses. For instance, one
commenter has argued that since an expert’s testimony consists of
that expert’s opinion, when the expert is unable to recall the basis
of the opinion, the expert’s memory loss may be seen as “selfimpeaching” in a way not applicable to all memory loss contexts.244
The commenter notes that an expert who cannot recall the basis of
his opinion—such as the expert in Fensterer—“may appear to a jury
to be less of an expert,” and the jury may readily discount his
opinion.245 In contrast, the commenter states that a lay witness who
offers an identification of an attacker—such as the witness in
Owens—may be seen by a jury as credible but “merely forgetful.”246
On the other hand, the Court could decide to treat expert and lay
witnesses similarly. Crawford replaced the Roberts reliability
approach with a focus on the procedural right to cross-examination.
From a procedural standpoint, it is unclear that an expert like Dr.
Planck offers the defense a much greater opportunity for crossexamination than a lay witness with complete memory loss would.
Moreover, although the Court has been sharply divided, a
majority of the Court has, so far, seemed unwilling to draw a brightline distinction between scientific witnesses and other types of
witnesses in the forensic report context.247 The view that analysts
and conventional witnesses should be treated similarly is
exemplified by Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts.248 Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinion in
Melendez-Diaz represents the opposing view.249 Justice Kennedy
chided the Court for not acknowledging the “real differences”
between “conventional witnesses” on the one hand and “laboratory
analysts who perform scientific tests” on the other.250 According to
Justice Kennedy, the Confrontation Clause’s text refers to types of
Seltz, supra note 193, at 886.
Id.
246 Id.
247 See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
248 See 557 U.S. 305, 307, 315–17 (2009).
249 See id. at 330–57 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
250 Id. at 330.
244
245
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persons, specifically to “witnesses against” a defendant.251
Laboratory analysts were not “witnesses against” the accused as
understood at the framing; the Clause instead targeted
conventional witnesses, i.e., those who perceive an event giving
them “personal knowledge of some aspect” of a defendant’s guilt.252
For Justice Kennedy, analysts are distinct from conventional
witnesses in at least three ways: (1) conventional witnesses recall
past events while analysts’ reports contain “near-contemporaneous
observations”; (2) analysts observe “neither the crime” itself, “nor
any human action relat[ing] to it”; and (3) conventional witnesses
“respond[] to questions under interrogation,” while laboratory tests
do not.253 Justice Scalia and the rest of the majority disagreed,
finding Justice Kennedy’s three purported distinctions
unavailing.254
Even though the issue was divisive—and even though Justices
Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett have now replaced Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, and Ginsburg—it remains unclear whether the
Court would rethink its position on treating analysts and lay
witnesses similarly.255 We anticipate Justice Gorsuch’s general
position on the Confrontation Clause and forensic reports will be
more similar to that of Justice Scalia than to that of Justice
Kennedy,256 and we would guess that the current Court would not
draw a bright-line distinction between analysts and conventional
witnesses in the forensic report context. For similar reasons,
Id. at 343.
Id. at 343–44. Justice Kennedy pointed out, among other things, that both Crawford
and Davis had concerned only conventional witnesses, and neither case held that anyone
making a testimonial statement was a Confrontation Clause “witness.” Id. at 330–31.
253 Id. at 345–46.
254 Id. at 315–17. Justice Scalia recognized “that ex parte examinations of the sort used at
[Sir Walter] Raleigh’s trial have ‘long been thought a paradigmatic confrontation violation’”
but argued that Raleigh’s case identified the “core” of the confrontation right, “not its limits.”
Id. at 315 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004)).
255 See Coleman & Rothstein, A Game of Katso and Mouse, supra note 3, at 51 (“It is unclear
exactly how [Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh] will rule on Confrontation Clause matters.”);
see generally United States v. King, 910 F.3d 320 (7th Cir. 2018) (providing an opinion
authored by then-Circuit Judge Barrett discussing the Confrontation Clause and a statement
made by a non-testifying co-defendant admitted at bench trial); United States v. Carnell, 972
F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 2020) (discussing the Confrontation Clause and admission of laboratory
reports for sentencing in a case before then-Circuit Judge Barrett).
256 See Coleman & Rothstein, A Game of Katso and Mouse, supra note 3, at 51.
251
252
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although analysts are only a subset of experts, we suspect that the
Court might also be hesitant to apply a different confrontation
standard to expert and lay witnesses in the memory loss context.

V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article was to identify and discuss eight key
issues arising in connection with memory impairment in
Confrontation Clause witnesses. Although the Court chose not to
put these eight issues to rest in the context of White or Tapia, we
anticipate that federal and state courts will be called upon to answer
these issues in the coming years, and we suspect the U.S. Supreme
Court will eventually need to answer them.
Assuming that Owens continues to be precedent and that the
Court prefers a bright-line approach, the Owens-Plus approach
would have some appeal, i.e., an approach under which complete
memory loss witnesses can afford a defendant her confrontation
rights. Setting a constitutional line that treats certain categories of
memory-impaired witnesses differently from others would be
difficult, and it would become infinitely more so if the Court
required greater scrutiny of what individual details were and were
not recalled. This may be why Justice Scalia in Owens appeared
unwilling to engage in line-setting,257 and it could also subtly
encourage the Court to adopt an Owens-Plus type approach.
However, there might also be instances where the Court feels a
memory-impaired witness simply offers the defense an insufficient
basis to test credibility. For instance, imagine a witness suffered
complete memory loss due to a well-documented, completely
understandable medical condition which arose only after she offered
her statements to law enforcement. In such an instance, the Court
may feel that even the bare opportunity to show the jury that the
witness forgets may not afford the defense sufficient opportunity to
attack credibility, since there would be a ready explanation for the
memory loss (the documented clinical condition) and the memory
loss would not necessarily call the prior statements into question
(since the memory loss took place after the statements).

257

See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559–64 (1988).
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If the Court chooses to require some greater degree of credibility
testing than what an Owens-Plus approach would necessitate, we
think one rule which has merit is that witnesses who can answer
any non-de minimis questions about the event or their statement
are sufficient for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. Although
use of “de minimis” still requires some subjective determinations on
the part of local courts, it seems much less subjective than other
options—such as “substantial” or “substantive”—and should clearly
reflect that in all but the most extreme instances, memory
impairment will not render a witness insufficient.
Since the U.S. Supreme Court opted not to clarify the law in this
area using White or Tapia,258 lower courts and local stakeholders
must continue to seek guidance from the existing precedent. Our
suspicion is that, if nothing else, the Court will at least continue to
recognize Owens and the notion that only some satisfactory basis to
challenge credibility is required. We hope that this Article helps
clarify the relevant issues and focuses more academic attention on
the area of memory loss and the Confrontation Clause.

258

See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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